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Abstract.  
Ephecticism is the tendency towards suspension of belief. Epistemology often focuses on the error 
of believing when one ought to doubt. The converse error—doubting when one ought to believe—
is relatively underexplored. This essay examines the errors of undue doubt. 
 
I draw on the relevant alternatives framework to diagnose and remedy undue doubts about rape 
accusations. Doubters tend to invoke standards for belief that are too demanding, for example, and 
underestimate how farfetched uneliminated error possibilities are. They mistake seeing how 
incriminating evidence is compatible with innocence for a reason to withhold judgement.  
 
Rape accusations help illuminate the causes and normativity of doubt. I propose a novel kind of 
epistemic injustice, for example, wherein patterns of unwarranted attention to farfetched error 
possibilities can cause those error possibilities to become relevant. Widespread unreasonable doubt 
thus renders doubt reasonable and makes it harder to know rape accusations. Finally, I emphasise 
that doubt is often a conservative force and I argue that the relevant alternatives framework helps 
defend against pernicious doubt-mongers. 
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1. The Global Skeptic and the Local Doubt-Monger  
Doubt is endemic to rape accusations. This doubt is often disproportionate, at least relative to track 
records—most accusations are true—and the total available evidence. The doubt is also 
disproportionate compared to hearers’ more trustful responses to relevantly similar claims, such as 
accusations of non-sexual violence. On hearing rape accusations, many people tend towards a chary 
ephecticism, viewing withholding as more cautious and virtuous than belief, or they outright disbelieve 
the accusation.1  
 
Epistemology focuses on errors of belief, such as believing despite paltry or misleading evidence. The 
converse errors—not believing despite excellent evidence—remains relatively underexplored.2 This 
relative neglect of the errors of doubt contributes to the sense that withholding belief is safe, cautious, 
and immune from criticism. This essay highlights the errors of undue doubt, focusing on doubts about 
rape accusations.  
 
 
1  This essay does not directly argue for the claims that rape accusations are often doubted and are often true. These 
patterns are documented elsewhere (Kelly, et al, 2005; Gilmore, 2017; Tuerkheimer, 2017; Epstein, 2021).  
2  Chrisman (2008), Medina (2015), Goldberg (2017), Ichikawa (2020), and Simion (forthcoming) are recent exceptions. 
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Note that I do not claim hearers should believe rape accusations tout court. Rape accusations are a 
heterogenous class and the claim is too coarse-grained to endorse, except perhaps as a generic, not 
universal, claim.3 My claim—that rape accusations receive disproportionate and undue doubt—is far 
weaker. These doubting patterns and dispositions admit of many kinds of explanation, some appealing 
to emotions like fear or guilt, or to social norms about sex and gender. I focus on diagnoses and 
remedies that are well-illuminated by epistemology, especially the relevant alternatives framework. 
Note too that disproportionate doubt is not unique to rape accusations. Other assertion kinds, such 
as claims about one’s disability status or young people’s assertions that they are not straight, also 
provoke undue doubt.  
 
An influential skeptical argument targets ordinary knowledge claims, such as knowledge that one has 
hands, by claiming one cannot rule out incompatible alternatives, such as that one is a handless brain-
in-a-vat. Global skepticism challenges all, or almost all, knowledge claims. Local skepticism, by 
contrast, denies knowledge about particular areas, such as the nature or existence of God. Few people, 
if any, are genuinely global skeptics. Local skepticism is typically easier to sustain and arguments for 
local skepticism are often more efficacious sources of doubt.  
 
In real life we rarely meet a skeptic, especially a global one. We more typically encounter a doubt-
monger. A doubt-monger expresses obdurate conviction that the evidence does not suffice to settle 
belief and they aim to instil doubt in others.4 Effective doubt-mongering is local; it does not target all 
assertions. Global doubt-mongers can be ignored as wholly unreasonable. Effective doubt-mongers 
selectively doubt certain kinds of claims or people, such as Holocaust narratives or vaccine scientists. 
They claim we can’t know whether smoking causes cancer, for example, or they express skepticism 
about rape accusations.  
 
By focusing on radical, global skepticism, epistemology risks overlooking the social and epistemic 
contours of selective doubt-mongering. Indeed, foregrounding global, radical skepticism can be 
pernicious because radical global skepticism generates false equivalency amongst diverse epistemic 
conduct. It lumps together, as non-knowers, the diligent scientist and the p-hacker, for example. And 
whereas epistemological skepticism usually focuses on abstract questions about whether beliefs qualify 
as knowledge, doubt-mongers aim to enervate beliefs. The latter is socially consequential. This essay 
shines a light on the everyday doubt-monger’s tricks and illuminates his mistakes. 
 
Rape accusations serve as a case study to better understand doubt, epistemic justification, and the 
forces of social power on epistemic practices. Similar ideas apply to undue doubt sustained by, for 
example, conspiracy theories.5 As I explain, the relevant alternatives framework illuminates new 
sources—and perhaps new species—of epistemic injustice. In classic accounts of testimonial injustice, 
the hearer commits an error. Typically, the hearer affords the speaker too little credit given her 
expertise or evidence. I posit a species of testimonial injustice where the hearer does not err. As an 
individual, his doubt is justified because widespread undue doubt renders ephecticism reasonable.  
 
 
3  Bolinger (2021) and Ferzan (2021) discuss generic interpretations of the imperative to ‘#BelieveWomen’. 
4  On the history of doubt-mongering, see Michaels (2008) and Oreskes and Conway (2010).  
5  Gardiner (forthcoming: §8) applies the relevant alternatives framework to gaslighting, testilying, crying wolf, and 
conspiracy theories.   
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Social power is a recurring theme: Doubt-mongering is often a conservative force. It allows people to 
preserve existing beliefs despite mounting counterevidence and thus favours the status quo. 
Ephecticism, inaction, and the resulting inertia are powerful. The efficacious skeptic, then, is the 
everyday doubt-monger, not the global skeptic of the philosophy classroom. We must scrutinise his 
epistemic position and arsenal.  
 
 
2. Ignoring is Powerful 
I begin with a condition on knowledge.6  
 
Relevant Alternatives Condition on Knowledge. S knows that p only if S can rule out all relevant 
alternatives to p.  
 
The thrust of this claim is anti-skeptical. It helps defend against the mongers of undue doubt. This 
might sound puzzling: the condition is a necessary condition on knowledge, not a sufficient condition. 
It says what we must do to possesses knowledge, but it does not state we possess knowledge if we 
satisfy the condition. So how can its thrust be anti-skeptical? It is anti-skeptical because it licences 
disregarding undue doubts.  
 
Suppose a birdwatcher, Bertha, sees a robin and forms the belief ‘That bird is a robin’. In order to 
know, her evidence must rule out ordinary alternatives, such as its being a thrush or sparrow. And 
typically—with a good look and normal background knowledge—her evidence does this.7 Bertha need 
not rule out more distant, farfetched, irrelevant possibilities. She is licensed to ignore them; she knows 
it is a robin. Suppose a doubt-monger claims, ‘You don’t know it is a robin, it could be a robot, a 
hologram, a disguised sparrow. Perhaps you are mistaken. Perhaps you have been drugged. Perhaps 
there is trick lighting, or you are dreaming…’ The doubt-monger tries to undermine Bertha’s belief or 
deny her claim to know. According to many relevant alternatives accounts, Bertha can simply disregard 
these error possibilities.8 These putative sources of doubt are irrelevantly farfetched. The doubt-
monger does not undermine Bertha’s knowledge merely by mentioning these possibilities. By 
disregarding the doubt-monger, Bertha remains a knower and so retains social power. Ignoring is 
powerful, and the relevant alternatives condition licences ignoring.  
 
The relevant alternatives condition posits key structural features: The claim, p. Error possibilities, also 
known as ‘alternatives’, are any claims inconsistent with p. If p is ‘the bird is a robin’, error possibilities 
include its being a sparrow, robot, and so on. Some error possibilities are mundane and normal. Our 
evidence continually eliminates uncountably many of these. Seeing the red chest rules out ‘sparrow’, 
 
6  See Dretske (1970, 1971), Stine (1976), Lewis (1996), Gerken (2017), Ichikawa (2017), McKinnon (2013), Lawlor 
(2013), and Gardiner (2019; forthcoming-b). Rysiew (2006) and Bradley (2014) emphasise the plausibility of the 
relevant alternatives condition and argue the condition is compatible with a wide range of epistemological views. 
Controversies arise with additional claims—supplementary to the basic relevant alternatives condition—such as 
contextualism about knowledge attributions.  
7  Ruling out error possibilities is ubiquitous and automatic. We need not think about error possibilities explicitly or think 
of ourselves as eliminating possibilities.  
 
8  Exceptions include Lewis (1996) and related contextualist accounts, which hold that merely raising error possibilities 
renders them relevant. I return to this.   
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for example. Other error possibilities are increasingly farfetched, bizarre, or skeptical. The ‘hologram’ 
possibility is remote. Remoteness of error possibility comes in degrees.9 
 
Error possibilities are dividable. Sparrow divides into normal sparrow and disguised sparrow, for 
example. Seeing the red chest eliminates the ‘normal sparrow’ possibility. Disguised sparrow is 
farfetched, and so can be properly ignored.10 The divisibility of error possibilities feeds the skeptical 
challenge and fuels doubt. Consider again the ‘normal sparrow’ error possibility. I said Bertha’s 
evidence eliminates it. But this was too quick. The possibility further cleaves into ‘normal sparrow 
with good viewing’, ‘normal sparrow in trick lighting’, ‘normal sparrow but Bertha was drugged and 
unknowingly hallucinates’, and so on. Her evidence may only eliminate the first of these sub-sub error 
possibilities. No matter how good one’s evidence is, there are always remaining uneliminated error 
possibilities.11 This inevitable remainder fuels the skeptical challenge.  
 
Evidence addresses a relevant error possibility by either being inconsistent with the possibility or, 
more commonly, being inconsistent with many sub-alternatives of the error possibility, leaving 
uneliminated only sub-alternatives that are disregardably farfetched. Some sub-sub-alternatives 
inevitably remain but, if the evidence is good and the uneliminated possibilities are sufficiently paltry 
and farfetched, they should be ignored.  
 
The relevant alternatives framework diagnoses the radical skeptic’s error and offers a remedy: Radical 
skeptical error possibilities are irrelevant to everyday knowledge claims. One may typically disregard 
them.12 It suggests a similar response to an unreasonable everyday doubt-monger. One must be 
sensitive to which error possibilities are disregardably remote. The doubt-monger notes that trick 
lighting is possible, for example, but trick lighting is normally farfetched. Even though the possibility 
is consistent with Brenda’s evidence—and so her evidence is consistent with not p—she can disregard 




The relevant alternatives framework posits the following basic schema: There is a claim, p, such as the 
bird is a robin. There are various not p possibilities, which can typically be sub-divided. Some sub-
alternatives are eliminated by the evidence. Others lie outwith a particular threshold; that is, they are 
sufficiently remote to properly ignore. The relevant alternatives account of knowledge posits a 
knowledge-relevant threshold of disregardability.13 One can adapt this schema by positing other 
thresholds, such as those governing legal standards of proof.  
 
Claim p is established to legal standard, L, only if the evidence eliminates the L-relevant error 
possibilities.  
 
9  Increasing remoteness does not entail a numerical or formal approach; that beaches vary in beauty does not entail a 
numerical beauty scale. Gardiner (2019; forthcoming-b) contrasts the relevant alternatives framework with quantifiable 
approaches to epistemic support.  
10  At least, it is ignorable in normal circumstances. There are some abnormal circumstances where the error possibility is 
relevant, such as a disguised bird convention.   
11  As described below, the cogito is an exception.  
12  Some relevant alternatives accounts hold that mundane knowledge ascriptions are undermined by mentioning or 
considering skeptical error possibilities. But even those views hold you can normally ignore those possibilities.  
13  Relevant alternatives accounts diverge on whether the knowledge-relevant threshold is fixed or shifty.  
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Indeed even if it fails as a condition on knowledge, the relevant alternatives framework might outline 
the structure of epistemic support provided by evidence. Consider the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ 
standard, which governs civil disputes in many jurisdictions. The relevant alternatives account of legal 
standards holds that claim p is established to a preponderance of the evidence only if the evidence 
adduced rules out preponderant error possibilities. (‘Preponderant’ mean the most significant and least 
remote.) Beyond reasonable doubt, which governs criminal conviction, is more demanding. It 
accordingly has a more distant disregardability threshold. Claim p is established beyond reasonable 
doubt only if the evidence rules out all reasonable error possibilities.14 
 
The increasingly demanding epistemic standards correspond to concentric rings. Error possibilities 
that can be disregarded for lower thresholds must be addressed to satisfy more demanding standards, 
such as knowledge and proof beyond reasonable doubt. There remains an extremal standard: Beyond 
all possible doubt. To satisfy this standard, evidence must eliminate all conceivable error possibilities. 
Few beliefs satisfy this demanding standard. The cogito survives: There are no uneliminated error 
possibilities. Doubt cannot take hold there. Plausibly the cogito is the only claim for which available 
evidence eliminates all possible doubt.15 For that claim—and perhaps that claim alone—we can 
respond to the doubt-monger with refutation, rather than by learning when to properly ignore him.  
 
To properly ignore the doubt-monger, one must be cognisant of what the error possibility is and its 
remoteness, and one must track the appropriate epistemic standard. Acceptance within normal 
conversation has a relatively permissive threshold. One need not rule out farfetched error possibilities 
for normal everyday assertion. Criminal proceedings, by contrast, are governed by a higher standard. 
One must eliminate relatively farfetched error possibilities. As I discuss in section six, one doubt-
mongering trick is illicitly invoking demanding epistemic standards in ordinary conversations.  
 
Unless otherwise specified, I focus on epistemic standards for assertions in ordinary conversational 
contexts, which is intermediate in demandingness between preponderance of evidence and beyond 
reasonable doubt.  
 
The relevant alternatives framework raises two central questions: What determines an error 
possibility’s remoteness and what are the various disregardability thresholds? Both questions ask why 
some error possibilities can be disregarded whilst others must be addressed. Various proposals have 
been advanced. These include, for example, that an alternative is relevant if true, believed, or 
mentioned.16 Similarity-based accounts hold that error possibilities are closer to the extent they 
resemble the actual world and remote to the extent they differ from the actual world.17 Others propose 
a possibility is closer to the extent that it is suggested by your evidence.18 Veronica Ivy (Rachel 
 
14  Gardiner (forthcoming-a; 2019) develops this proposal. See also Ho (2008), Amaya (2015), and Moss (forthcoming). 
Strictly speaking the rings need not be concentric. Perhaps some error possibilities are relevant to the ‘preponderance’ 
standard but irrelevant to a higher standard. This can occur if, for example, civil procedure requires addressing error 
possibilities that are ignorable in criminal trials.   
15  Other possible exceptions include claims about some mental states and simple mathematical, logical, true-by-definition, 
and tautological claims. 
16  Lewis (1996), McKinnon (2013), Gerken (2017), Ichikawa (2017), and Gardiner (2019; forthcoming-b: §5) discuss what 
determines remoteness. 
17  Pritchard (2005); Smith (2010; 2016). 
18  Stine (1976), Austin (1946).  
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McKinnon, 2013) posits an error possibility is remote to the extent it is ‘destabilising’, meaning its 
uptake would or should trigger a significant restructuring of one’s background beliefs about how the 
world works.19 David Lewis (1996)’s rule of attention claims that merely attending to an uneliminated 
error possibility suffices for undermining knowledge. This essay argues against Ivy’s view and Lewis’s 
rule of attention.  
 
Lewis (1996: 559) proposes the rule of conservation. He writes, 
 
Suppose that those around us normally do ignore certain possibilities, and it is common knowledge that they do […] 
Then—again, very defeasibly!—these generally ignored possibilities may properly be ignored. We are permitted, 
defeasibly, to adopt the usual and mutually expected presuppositions of those around us.  
 
The principle endorses deferring to one’s community—if people tend to disregard a possibility, it can 
be properly ignored. It is constructivist, in the sense that actual behaviour shapes epistemic 
normativity, and it highlights epistemic dependency: Reliance on others is not limited to acquiring 
evidence and epistemic abilities. Other people’s practices indicate, and determine, which error 
possibilities are properly disregardable.20 
 
Consider a converse conservation principle: If others tend to take seriously an error possibility and 
treat it as relevant, it is (defeasibly) thereby relevant. This principle has merit. Suppose locals tend to 
take seriously the possibility the observed bird is a disguised sparrow. Locals consider this a reason to 
doubt putative robin sightings. If this source of doubt is common, including amongst intelligent and 
epistemically virtuous locals, it thereby constitutes evidence that disguised sparrows are a serious 
possibility. It is evidence there are—or might well be—disguised sparrows around. Perhaps someone 
dyes local sparrows, for example, and robins are rare. Arguably if locals seriously consider this error 
possibility, and accordingly lack confidence the observed bird is a robin, then Bertha would be 
epistemically reckless to ignore these doubts and retain conviction that the bird is a robin. Her 
evidence does not, after all, address this error possibility. This shows an epistemic potency of having 
or expressing doubts. It can cause others to doubt, and even render error possibilities relevant, so that 
others should have doubts.  
 
Note that sometimes the source of doubt is chimerical, and although others worry about the spectre 
of uneliminated error possibilities, an individual need not cede social and epistemic power. Despite 
widespread doubts, in some cases Bertha can retain belief and knowledge that it is a sparrow, for 
example. I return to this below. Note too that although the attentional conduct of oneself and others 
can influence an error possibility’s relevance, by contributing to the error possibility’s perceived 
importance, mere isolated attention by itself does not suffice for relevance. That is, an uneliminated 
error possibility’s arising in thought or talk does not undermine knowledge or justified belief. If it did, 
the doubt-monger would be on firm ground because when he merely mentions any farfetched error 
possibility, one’s evidence must eliminate it. The doubt-monger wins. 
 
This essay is largely ecumenical about what determines remoteness. I explore two proposals about 
remoteness of error possibility. Firstly, an error possibility is nearby to the extent it is a normal source 
of error. For a proposition and evidence set, an error possibility is nearby insofar as it is typically true 
 
19  Veronica Ivy previously published as Rachel McKinnon. 
20  Gardiner (2022) investigates epistemic effects of social patterns of attention, including learning from others what to 
ignore and pay attention to.  
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given the evidence. If the error possibility’s obtaining is abnormal given the evidence, the error 
possibility is—to that extent—remote. In almost every case, it would be extremely weird for a bird 
that looks like a robin to be a disguised sparrow. Hence, this error possibility is remote Normality, and 
corresponding remoteness, come in degrees.21  
 
Secondly, an error possibility is nearby to the extent that evidence indicates it is true. Suppose a reliable, 
experienced local birdwatcher says, with apparent sincerity, ‘That bird is actually a disguised sparrow’. 
Their assertion is evidence for the error possibility, which renders it less remote. Whereas before 
Bertha could disregard this farfetched possibility, perhaps now she cannot. She no longer knows it is 
a robin without addressing the newly-relevant error possibility. An expert’s treating an error possibility 
as true can constitute evidence it is true, and so perhaps can cause the possibility to become relevant. 
It is, after all, typically dogmatic and arrogant to disregard others when forming beliefs, especially 
experts. I return to this in section eight.    
 
These two criteria for determining remoteness—error possibilities being normal and being indicated 
by the evidence—usually coincide. People raise error possibilities that are common sources of error, 
and evidence reliably indicates what is normally true. But they can diverge. Conspiracies theories, 
gaslighting, or mental illness, for example, can generate evidence for error possibilities that are wholly 
abnormal.22 Conversely, a possibility might be normally true, but widely unappreciated and so 
obscured by available evidence. Consider an error possibility that involves repression of a traumatic 
memory, for example. This might be a normal, common source of error but—until such repression is 





The relevant alternatives framework highlights and systematises two central kinds of error.23 Firstly, a 
person can err by treating a nearby error possibility as remote. They ignore a source of error they 
should address, and so believe p when they should withhold. Suppose a police officer, Percy, is accused 
of rape but his colleague, Collin, attests, ‘I was with Percy during the time of the alleged assault. It 
could not have been him.’ Claim p is ‘Percy is innocent’. Consider a source of doubt: Perhaps Percy 
is guilty and Collin is lying. Suppose a hearer considers this possibility farfetched and so disregards it. 
Police officers would not lie to cover up rape, she thinks. If such behaviour is not farfetched, then she 
commits the first kind of error, and so believes p when she should doubt. 
 
The first error—regarding nearby error possibilities as remote—causes ignorance. Ignorance results 
because either p is falsely believed or p is truly believed but unknown because of uneliminated relevant 
error possibilities.  
 
The second error is the converse. A person errs by treating a remote error possibility as nearby. They 
treat a source of doubt as relevant when they should instead disregard it. The error possibility is bizarre 
and abnormal—something they should disregard—but they fail to appreciate that the possibility is 
 
21  ‘Typically’ admits numerical and non-numerical interpretations (Smith, 2010; 2016).  
22  See also the passenger testimony and school shooting examples in Gardiner (forthcoming-b: 11-12).   
23  There are, needless to say, other kinds of error, such as forgetting evidence.   
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farfetched. They consider it a common, ordinary possibility. Since their evidence does not eliminate 
this farfetched error possibility, they harbour doubt where they should instead believe.  
 
Suppose five women each accuse a wealthy celebrity, Caleb, of sexual violence, and one of them sues 
for damages. In the US, the relatively low ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard—often glossed as 
more likely than not—governs such civil litigation. Claim p is ‘Caleb committed the crime’. In court, 
the women describe strikingly similar criminal sexual violence and, furthermore, they testify they had 
not met before approaching investigators. The jurors take seriously the error possibilities—that is, 
possibilities in which Caleb is innocent. They consider the possibility the women are secretly friends 
who concocted their stories for financial gain and are lying when they deny knowing each other 
beforehand. The jurors decide this error possibility is preponderant and uneliminated, and accordingly 
find in favour of the defendant. Plausibly the jurors err by treating a remote source of doubt as 
relevant. They should have instead realised the error possibility was remote enough to properly ignore. 
 
Epistemology focuses on the importance of avoiding false beliefs and often underemphasises the 
converse error of failing to believe despite compelling evidence. This error can manifest irrationality, 
evidential insensitivity, and failure to appropriately represent reality. The error has practical 
significance when belief is needed for action. Withholding is widely viewed as more cautious and 
careful, but withholding and inaction have effects. Withholding despite compelling evidence can 
constitute and cause various injustices, including unduly doubting speakers. Since withholding belief 
often underwrites inaction, doubting often favours the status quo. Doubt-mongering can be a potent 
conservative force against social change, such when one instils doubts that a new policy is viable or 
that change is needed.  
 
Note that doubt is not univocally a conservative force. Lack of doubting also perpetuates inertia, such 
as when citizens unquestioningly consume mainstream media. And neither doubt nor conservative 
forces are monolithically good or bad.24 Finally, people often believe too firmly. Rather than demonise 
doubt and inertia, I interrogate distributions and sources of doubt. 
 
As noted above, error possibilities are always further dividable and—cogito aside—remaining 
uneliminated error possibilities are inevitable. Caleb’s innocence is inevitably consistent with any 
mounting incriminating evidence, but only via increasingly farfetched error possibilities, such as an 
increasingly elaborate conspiracy against him. A common error, one highlighted by the relevant 
alternatives framework, treats the mere consistency of innocence and available evidence as sufficient 
for doubt. The doubter is too impressed by mere consistency, perhaps failing to appreciate that 
consistency is almost guaranteed, and exhibits insensitivity to the fact that the only remaining error 
possibilities are remote enough to properly ignore.  
 
These two kinds of error—treating remote error possibilities as nearby and nearby ones as remote—
can be systemic. The errors are not randomly distributed. This systemic misestimation of remoteness 
of error possibility can comprise social epistemic injustice. These kinds of error and concomitant 
injustices are pernicious because the perceived remoteness of an error possibility is often implicit and 
resistant to counterevidence. It is determined by prejudice, emotion, upbringing, and background 
culture, and so misplacements of error possibilities can be relatively difficult to notice, discuss, and 
correct. It is typically easier to discern whether someone lacks evidence, for example, because it can 
 
24  A perceptive conservative student commented that he favours the status quo, and accordingly values doubt. I am 
grateful to Richard Arning, Cat Saint-Croix, and Jon Garthoff for helpful comments.  
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be relatively easy to unearth who has heard what information. It is typically more challenging to 
communicate about perceived remoteness of error possibilities. 
 
 
5. Threshold-Shifting and Alternative-Shifting  
We can contrast the relevant alternatives framework with the more simple ‘quantifiable balance’ 
framework. On this rival model, epistemic support is a matter of probability given the evidence, and 
epistemic standards—such as knowledge and legal standards of proof—correspond to numerical 
evidential probability thresholds.25 The relevant alternatives framework is richer. It posits increasingly 
farfetched error possibilities and various disregardability thresholds, and thus holds greater promise 
for systematising, explaining, and diagnosing the doubt provoked by narratives of sexual assault.  
 
This richer framework engenders distinctions unavailable to the quantifiable balance framework, such 
as the distinction between whether practical factors shift the overall disregardability threshold or shift 
the relative disregardability of particular error possibilities. Gardiner (forthcoming-b: §7) calls these 
‘threshold-shifting’ and ‘alternative-shifting’ respectively and argues the quantifiable balance model 
captures only the first of these.26  
 
To illustrate the former: Pragmatic encroachment holds that when error costs are increased, more 
evidence is required to know. On most interpretations, this requires an increase in evidential 
probability or rational confidence, or addressing more error possibilities without specification of 
which particular error possibilities are newly relevant. This exemplifies ‘threshold-shifting’ because the 
overall threshold moves. To illustrate the latter: On Lewis’s view, mentioning an error possibility 
renders it relevant. This illustrates ‘alternative-shifting’. (These claims illustrate the distinction, but I 
deny both claims.) 
 
The distinction between ‘threshold-shifting’ and ‘alternative-shifting’ helps explain how social forces 
affect the aptness of doubt. Note that for each illustration, relevant alternatives theories diverge about 
whether the relevance of error possibility—and thus whether the evidence suffices for judgement—
genuinely shifts or only appears to shift. The latter holds that other people’s doubting conduct cannot 
epistemically justify doubt. Section eight investigates this question. 
 
Suppose local birdwatchers are generally wary of bird identification claims and demand substantial 
evidence before updating the group’s birding log. This conduct is evidence that costs of false positives 
are high—perhaps the data are used for scientific inquiry, for example—which can raise Bertha’s 
disregardability threshold for asserting bird identification claims to the group. It also suggests false 
positives are common, perhaps because bird identification is challenging. Bertha may accordingly seek 
additional evidence before settling on bird identification judgements, especially if she is currently 
learning birdwatching norms. This illustrates (perceived) threshold-shifting.  
 
 
25  Gardiner (2019; forthcoming-b) and Gardiner and Zaharatos (ms) argue the relevant alternatives framework models 
epistemic support better than the rival quantifiable balance approach. 
26  Gardiner (forthcoming-b: §7) argues this distinction is required to understand recent theorising about moral 
encroachment and epistemic partiality because these views hold—or should hold—that moral features affect the 
relative disregardability of error possibilities. This cannot be understood as simply shifting an overall threshold of 
evidence or probability, independent from specific error possibilities. For moral encroachment surveys, see Bolinger 
(2020) and Gardiner (2018).  
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Secondly, other people’s doubt can lead to (perceived) ‘alternative-shifting’. Recall the local expert 
taking seriously the possibility an observed bird is a disguised sparrow. This doubting conduct provides 
evidence the error possibility is relevant. The overall (apparent) disregardability threshold does not 
shift, but the expert’s doubt may cause an otherwise farfetched error possibility to seem, or even 
become, relevant for Bertha.  
 
Doubt is contagious. And it should be. But this leads to injustice when that doubt is undue and unfairly 




6. Testimonial Injustice  
Testimonial injustice is often glossed as a speaker’s unfairly receiving less credibility than they are 
owed. But arguably credibility amounts—both assigned and owed—are unrealistic or ill-understood 
posits, especially if understood as simple magnitudes.27 The relevant alternatives framework suggests 
an alternative conception: Testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker’s assertions are not regarded 
as ruling out relevant error possibilities. Hearers unfairly regard distant uneliminated error possibilities 
as relevant or unfairly regard nearby ones as not eliminated by the testimony. This can be through 
(perceived) threshold-shifting or alternative-shifting factors. One must add additional conditions, such 
as being caused by prejudice, to yield a full account. This essay only posits the underlying 
epistemological structure of testimonial injustice. 
 
First, consider threshold-shifting. In ordinary conversation, speakers are typically happy to flat-out 
assert second-hand assertions. If Jill hears that Larry and Laura used to date, typically this suffices for 
Jill to repeat the claim, without a reportative hedge, like ‘Larry says that he used to date Laura’ or ‘I 
heard that they used to date’. This is because testimony normally suffices for knowledge and the costs 
of false assertion, including the hearer’s resulting false belief, are not deemed strikingly high.  
 
Rape accusations are often treated differently. Speakers disproportionately use reportatives, like ‘Jane 
says that’ and other hedges, like ‘alleged’. Second-hand testimony about rape accusations 
characteristically distances itself from flat-out asserting the claim. Widespread caution and doubt 
generally indicates either that false belief is easy in the domain or that false belief is costly. (To illustrate 
the former, consider viewing optical illusions. For the latter, recall one’s hesitancy in flat-out asserting 
important appointment times without double-checking.) Either way, other people’s cautious and 
ephectic tendencies expands the perceived disregardability threshold.  
 
Costs of falsely believing a rape accusation are seen as strikingly high in everyday contexts. Gardiner 
(forthcoming-c) argues they are markedly overestimated; the actual costs are not notably high. Many 
doubters also overlook the costs of not believing a true accusation. If pressed about the costs of their 
falsely believing an accusation, people give explanations like, ‘The accused person could go to prison’. 
These reasons are almost always mistaken. This quote was from a bright student in my advanced 
epistemology seminar, for example. ‘You aren’t a juror’, I pressed, ‘So imprisonment isn’t a 
consequence of your belief.’ ‘But I could be a juror’ the student protested. This exemplifies how high 
legal standards are illicitly imported into non-legal conversations about rape accusations. The speaker 
 
27  I am grateful to Amy Flowerree for this suggestion.  
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projected himself into a juror role and, given the high standards operative in the projection, withheld 
judgement in his actual mundane context. This conduct is common.  
 
The term ‘rape allegation’, rather than ‘accusation’, contributes to this endemic importing of legal 
standards into everyday conversational contexts. ‘Allegation’ is commonly used for rape accusations 
but is otherwise seldom used outside legal contexts.  
 
In sum, positing multiple or moveable disregardability thresholds raises the question of which 
epistemic standards are operative in the context. Epistemic injustice occurs when rape accusations are 
unduly seen as governed by highly demanding epistemic standards.28 This tendency breeds doubt 
about rape accusations, since even if the accuser possesses evidence that can satisfy criminal legal 
standards, that evidence is rarely available in everyday conversational contexts. Given the mismatch 
between standards for acceptance and evidence typically available, doubt prevails.  
 
Secondly, consider mechanisms that shift the (perceived) relative disregardability of particular error 
possibilities. Testimony that p typically eliminates all nearby error possibilities, and so typically 
conduces to knowledge. This is because assertions are typically sensitive to p; normally S would not 
assert p unless p obtains. And so, for most assertion kinds, false assertion is abnormal. That is, if S 
asserts p, the only uneliminated not-p possibilities are ones in which she is mistaken or lying, and these 
are—for most ordinary assertion kinds and practical contexts—sufficiently remote to properly ignore. 
Lying is, accordingly, treated as a remote error possibility and the assertion is believed.  
 
But for rape accusations, distant error possibilities can be unduly deemed nearby. This includes, for 
example, an accuser’s lying for financial gain. Widespread mentioning of this possibility fuels the sense 
that it commonly occurs, and so the error possibility can thereby feel relevant.  
 
Gardiner (forthcoming-c) describes ‘as-if disregarding’ and ‘as-if regarding’. In the former, the person 
does not genuinely regard the error possibility as farfetched, but they treat it as disregardably farfetched 
for conversational, moral, prudential, or belief-forming purposes. ‘As-if regarding’ is treating an error 
possibility as relevant despite considering it disregardably farfetched.29 Suppose a hearer, Harry, 
professes to doubt an accusation because the accused denies it and Harry claims the accused is unlikely 
to lie. If Harry does not sincerely regard this error possibility as farfetched, he is as-if disregarding. 
Gardiner (forthcoming-c) describes how as-if disregarding and regarding is performed for moral and 
social reasons but has epistemic consequences. It affects the (apparent) relevance of particular error 
possibilities. The next section discusses how attending to particular error possibilities, especially in a 
puzzle-solving mode, can illusively make them appear relevant. These mechanisms shift the (apparent) 
remoteness of particular error possibilities and thus sustain doubt about rape accusations. Given the 
causes and distributions of this doubt, it constitutes testimonial injustice.   
  
 
28  Gerken (forthcoming) and Dotson (2018) argue that pragmatic encroachment entails that marginalised individuals 
often know less than other people because they frequently encounter higher stakes. Similarly on some views, one cost 
of criminal victimisation is that one cannot assert subsequent accusations without raising conversational stakes. (Note 
I argue people commonly overestimate the costs of believing false accusations.) Cf. Ichikawa (2020). Gardiner 
(forthcoming-c) discusses further (perceived) threshold-shifting mechanisms.  
29 ‘As-if’ regarding and disregarding concerns behaviour. Moral encroachment, by contrast, claims the relative 
disregardability of error possibilities is affected by moral facts. Gardiner (2018; forthcoming-b) criticises moral 
encroachment. 
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I close this section with two final comments about testimonial injustice. Firstly, the testimonial 
injustice characteristic of rape accusations is best characterised by assertion content, rather than by 
the speaker’s membership in a social group. Any speaker making an acquaintance rape accusation is 
likely to face undue doubt.   
 
Secondly, reflecting on testimony and doubt suggests another advantage of the relevant alternatives 
framework over the rival ‘quantifiable balance’ model, on which epistemic support is largely a matter 
of numerical probability given the evidence. People are generally believed when they assert improbable 
claims. If the proposition is merely improbable, uptake is usually frictionless. Suppose a person asserts 
that ticket 796240 won the lottery, Hilary Clinton is in London, or The Times misspelt the Ghanaian 
president’s name. These things are improbable given a hearer’s prior evidence. Yet when asserted, the 
speaker is usually believed. Hearers’ suspicion arises when assertions are, or are perceived to be, 
farfetched. That is, assertions that are antecedently considered merely improbable do not raise eyebrows 
or provoke doubts. Farfetched ones do.  
 
This distinction—which is hard to countenance on the simpler quantifiable balance model of 
epistemic support—helps model testimonial injustice. Many claims about rape victimisation are 
deemed not merely improbable, but farfetched. Gardiner (ms) describes how supplying details about 
how acquaintance rape occurred induces doubt because hearers harbour unacknowledged and often 
unsupported background beliefs that specific modes of rape are implausible. Hearers assume the 
‘freeze response’ or remaining asleep during penetration are farfetched, for example. Similarly, it is 
seen as farfetched that nice men commit rape or that victims are friendly to assailants afterwards. 
Testimonial injustice occurs because, owing to rape myths, normal claims are seen as farfetched and 




The relevant alternatives framework highlights an epistemic pitfall to which reasoners are vulnerable. 
I suggest that merely considering an error possibility does not make that possibility relevant. But 
farfetched error possibilities can delusively appear relevant, reasonable, or plausible in virtue of 
‘cleverly’ thinking of them.  
 
Suppose Rafaela accuses Paul of raping her when they were in high school. She sues him. Claim p is 
‘Paul is guilty’. Evidence includes an affidavit from Rafaela’s former therapist attesting that Rafaela 
described the incident ten years ago, identifying Paul by name. This evidence is highly incriminating. 
It eliminates many error possibilities, including almost all those in which Rafaela recently fabricated 
the story. But the evidence is not fully conclusive; it does not eliminate all possible doubt. This is no 
surprise: Recall that for almost every claim, remaining uneliminated error possibilities are inevitable. 
The anti-skeptical thrust of the relevant alternatives account emphasises the inevitable remainder is 
unproblematic.  
 
One helpful conception of skeptical challenges is as attempts to deny us epistemic properties that we 
value and—crucially—that we hitherto thought we possessed. We value fully conclusive evidence that 
eliminates all error possibilities. But one should not think one possesses it, even before encountering 
the skeptic. Uneliminated error possibilities are thus not, as such, a cause for doubt. Only relevant 
ones are.  
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Consider the error possibility that Paul is innocent and Rafaela has a lifelong obsession with him. This 
possibility is not merely consistent with the affidavit, it is even somewhat highlighted by it. As 
described above, evidence addresses a relevant error possibility by either being wholly inconsistent 
with the possibility or—more commonly—being inconsistent with many sub-alternatives of that error 
possibility, and leaving uneliminated only sub-alternatives that are irrelevantly farfetched. But the 
evidence, by doing this, can thereby draw attention to these remote error possibilities. The factfinder 
may never have considered the possibility of a lifelong obsession unless prompted by the evidence.  
 
The very process of eliminating error possibilities can make remote error possibilities seem important 
because factfinders thereby think about them as uneliminated and so confront the fact their evidence 
is consistent with uneliminated error possibilities. This does not make the possibilities relevant, but it 
can make them feel relevant. Attention is drawn to those exonerating error possibilities that the 
evidence does not eliminate. As increasingly incriminating evidence stacks up against Paul, this can 
have the unintended consequence of drawing attention to the convoluted sub-sub-sub alternatives in 
which he is innocent. Factfinders can thereby mistakenly think of such error possibilities as significant.  
 
Indeed when evidence addresses a sub-alternative, that evidence can make a subset of that sub-
alternative more probabilistically likely. But the uneliminated error possibility nonetheless remains 
beyond the relevant threshold—too farfetched, that is, to take seriously. The therapist’s affidavit 
increases the evidential probability of a lifelong obsession. This error possibility is, in almost every 
case, itself too outlandish to require addressing. Factfinders would not have considered it prior to 
hearing the evidence. Mistaking an increase in evidential probability for the possibility’s becoming 
relevant is an epistemic pitfall.  
 
Thinking of these error possibilities and seeing that they are consistent with the evidence adduced can 
create an ‘ah-ha’ moment; a psychological feeling of having figured something out, like fitting puzzle 
pieces together. In a sense, the thinker has solved a puzzle—they have taken highly incriminating 
evidence—the affidavit—and seen how it can nonetheless fit with innocence. This can require skill 
and creativity. On seeing how the evidence can cohere with innocence, things can ‘click’, fit together, 
and make sense. Ordinarily ‘ah-ha’ feelings indicate truth or understanding. Thus the ‘ah-ha’ feeling 
can delusively suggest the error possibility is significant or even true.  
 
The ‘ah-ha’ moment can feel like evidence that Rafaela harboured a lifelong obsession. And so the 
merely epistemically possible can feel epistemically boosted in virtue of the cognitive pathway by 
which it was reached. That is, the very strength of the inculpatory evidence—it eliminated all but 
farfetched error possibilities—itself lends (delusive) credence to the ‘obsession’ error possibility 
because it was reached via an intellectual accomplishment, with its resulting ‘ah-ha’ sensation. The 
mistake is that one of the constraints in the puzzle-solving exercise was fixed inappropriately. The 
thinker was only following the path because of undue attachment to the defendant’s innocence.  
 
Indeed epistemic support is not mediated only by the ‘ah-ha’ phenomenology. Plausibly coherence of 
propositions itself generates epistemic support, albeit weak support. A proper perspective appreciates 
that fitting together with inappropriately fixed propositions is not epistemic support worth embracing. 
The relevant alternatives model diagnoses the undue doubt and proposes a remedy. Thinkers should 
always bear relative plausibility in mind. The incriminating evidence is consistent with Paul’s 
innocence, but it is more plausible that he raped her, as she claims.  
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A similar psychological mechanism plausibly underlies some apologetics, theology, and conspiracy 
theories. The intellectual achievement sees how the puzzle pieces fit. The mistake is undue attachment 
to some puzzle pieces. Over fifty women accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. Their accounts are 
strikingly similar. The evidence is difficult to doubt. Difficult but—as the relevant alternatives 
framework makes clear—never impossible. A conspiracy theory developed that these women are paid 
accusers because Cosby tried to buy NBC and create empowering mainstream Black entertainment. 
His former co-star Phylicia Rashad told reporters, for example, ‘Well, my initial reaction to the 
allegations was, “Hmmm. Someone has a vested interest in preventing Mr. Cosby’s return to network 
television.”’30 Similar conspiracies developed around the accusations of Julian Assange, Brett 
Kavanaugh, Donald Trump, Bill Clinton, MJ Akbar, Michael Jackson, and others.  
 
The psychology of social power helps illuminate this phenomenon. By using their epistemic creativity 
to find sources of doubt consistent with damning evidence, the doubter retains social power. Their 
stance is ‘I need not accept what you say. I can think of a reason to doubt.’ They feel they can ‘defend’ 
themselves from the ‘threat’ of changing their mind. They ‘resist’ having to adapt to new knowledge, 
such as that a beloved entertainer or favoured activist is a sex criminal. Doubt, recall, is often a 
conservative force. It helps resist change—both change of mind and social change. Doubt supports 
inaction and preserves the status quo. Recalling Cosby tried to buy NBC can feel satisfying. It can feel 
victorious to resist attempts to force you to change your perspective, beliefs, or society.  
 
The relevant alternatives approach is a non-skeptical, belief-friendly framework. Belief does not 
require eliminating every possible source of doubt; only relevant ones. The theory emphasises that 
remaining uneliminated alternatives are inevitable, and so fixating on them is not clever or important. 
An anti-skeptical approach to rape accusations pairs this framework with two further claims, which I 
do not argue for in this essay. Firstly, false rape accusations are relatively abnormal. Typically the 
possibility is sufficiently rare and farfetched to ignore for most ordinary contexts, such as mundane 
conversations. Secondly, the disregardability threshold is not sky-high compared to other claims in 
everyday conversation. Even if it is higher for rape accusations than for other claims, hearers typically 
overestimate this difference. Combining these claims means that doubting rape accusations is often 
erroneous.  
 
This raises the question of what attitude hearers should have towards the denial of disregardable error 
possibilities like, for example, ‘Rafaela described a fictional incident to her therapist because of a 
lifelong obsession with Paul’. Are hearers epistemically justified in believing, accepting, assuming, 
presupposing, or asserting that this counterclaim is false? Different relevant alternative accounts yield 
different responses to this question.31 Rather than address this question, I instead emphasise that 
epistemic agency is not exhausted by propositional attitudes, such as belief, disbelief, suspension, and 
credences towards particular propositions. Epistemic normativity is far broader than determining 
which propositional attitudes are warranted by evidence currently possessed. It includes, for example, 
how to interpret narratives, which hermeneutical frames to develop, how to learn, what to inquire 
about, and what to ignore. I propose we are epistemically licensed to ignore such error possibilities, at 
least in most ordinary circumstances. Ignoring the irrelevant exhibits cognitive virtue.32 My proposal 
 
30  France (2015). 
31  See, for example, Wright (2004) and Coliva (2015), who hold we accept or assume the denial of irrelevant error 
possibilities, and this differs from belief.  
32  Gardiner (2022) theorises attunement, the cognitive virtues of attention.  
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focuses on epistemic conduct and social power. It is consistent with various accounts of whether can 




8. Rendering Relevant: A New Species of Epistemic Injustice 
People are not epistemic islands. We gain evidence and epistemic skills from others. As section three 
describes, we also gain a sense from others of which error possibilities can be properly ignored. We 
observe what sources of doubt others take seriously and which they disregard.33  
 
Most rape accusations are true. Yet many people habitually take seriously error possibilities in which 
the accuser is lying or mistaken. Error possibilities marshalled include lying for revenge, money, 
political reasons, and so on. The jilted lover looms large in the public imagination.34 This raises the 
question: Suppose society tends to treat particular error possibilities as relevant, do they thereby 
become relevant? If someone accuses a politician, for example, should we normally suspend 
judgement unless presented with evidence addressing the possibility the accuser is lying for political 
reasons?  
 
Assuming this conduct is rare, it is typically a distant error possibility. But if sufficiently many people 
treat it as relevant, is it thereby relevant? Call this the ‘constructivism question’. In section three I 
suggested two factors that could contribute to an error possibility being nearby: If it is normal and if 
one’s evidence suggests it is true or normal. If enough people wonder about the accusers’ political 
motivations—both generally and in specific cases—doesn’t this constitute evidence that the error 
possibility is true or normal?  
 
Space does not permit a full response to the constructivism question, so I must be brief. A central 
argument for yes—society thereby renders the possibility relevant—emphasises that it is usually 
dogmatic and overconfident to ignore what so many take seriously. If others take the possibility 
seriously, this is evidence that it is true or, at least, not outlandish. A central argument for no is that 
people can be mistaken en masse. On this view, people who raise these sources of doubt are 
predominantly mistaken, and it is not epistemic virtue to copy others’ mistakes, no matter how 
common. This view holds that widespread doubt does not render doubt appropriate. 
 
One might argue the error possibility merely seems relevant but does not thereby become relevant. 
But note this seeming can itself cause people to lose confidence. And, furthermore, arguably it typically 
should: It can be irrational to retain conviction despite uneliminated error possibilities that seem 
relevant, especially when those around you withhold belief.35   
 
33  Gardiner (forthcoming-b: §8) applies the relevant alternatives framework to conspiracy theories and gaslighting. Many 
questions raised in this section apply to these topics.   
34  Kelly, Lovett, and Regan (2005).  
35  Whether belief is justified despite widespread doubt depends on manifold features, including one’s broader 
understanding. Error theories that explain an error possibility’s salience can help preserve rational confidence, for 
example. Asking whether an individual’s particular belief is justified reveals how interlaced epistemic norms are with 
one’s social context, developmental conditions, and broader character and understanding. I suspect these latter 
questions—and investigating what epistemic character and society people have and should cultivate—are more 
significant than whether individuals’ beliefs are warranted. I am grateful to Renée Bolinger, Jon Garthoff, Jessie 
Munton, and Wayne Riggs for helpful conversations.  
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In addressing the constructivism question, we must distinguish (a) people deeming the possibility 
relevant from (b) people deeming it true. Those in category (a) withhold belief and express doubt 
unless the error possibility is addressed by evidence. Those in (b) tend to, for example, assert the 
accuser is lying, not merely that she might be. The former might be construed as epistemic caution—
albeit perhaps erroneous caution—the latter cannot be. The two categories may affect relevance 
differently. Perhaps, for example, only conduct characteristic of category (b), but not (a), can render 
error possibilities relevant. Note that this intermediate answer to the constructivism question will not 
satisfy those who aim to vindicate fully ignoring doubt-mongers.  
 
Recall Lewis’s rule of conservation and the converse principle ‘if everyone treats a doubt as relevant, 
it thereby (defeasibly) becomes relevant’. This discussion highlights how these principles are 
conservative forces. They perpetuate, endorse, and even prescribe, the doubt and suspicion endemic 
to rape accusations. The principles—which support constructivism about relevance—affirm the status 
quo, even where that status quo is disproportionate skepticism about reliable kinds of assertion.  
 
If the answer to the constructivism question is yes, this suggests a new kind of testimonial injustice. 
Society renders an error possibility relevant, where it otherwise would have been disregardably 
farfetched. On this variety of injustice, a person asserts a plausible rape accusation. The hearer doubts 
the assertion. This is unjust because rape accusations tend to be true and typically warrant belief. But, 
crucially, the hearer has not committed an epistemic error. He has not afforded her too little credibility 
or harboured undue doubt. His doubt is epistemically apposite given epistemic features of the context. 
Given the uneliminated relevant error possibility, he should withhold. As an individual, his doubt is 
reasonable. It is nonetheless epistemic injustice because the epistemic features he responds to are 
constructed by society. Widespread disproportionate doubting of rape accusations is why the error 
possibilities are relevant.  
 
Consider non-rape illustrations of contagious doubt. In 2020 it was widely reported that the El Dorado 
wildfire was caused by a bungled gender reveal stunt. Shortly afterwards, social media uses began to 
express doubts. Seeing those doubts undermined my belief. I didn’t read news reports myself, so my 
suspending was appropriate. Or consider the 1980-90s culture of suspicion around civil lawsuits 
against large corporations. The ubiquitous, ingrained suspicion against plaintiffs exemplifies the 
culture-shaping power of large corporations.36 Returning to rape accusations, consider a hypothetical 
society in which some fathers sexually abuse their children, but almost everybody assumes this is 
vanishingly rare and instead suspect almost all incest accusations are caused by so-called ‘Daddy 
issues’. If this defeater is widespread, including across experts, this culture of doubt might justify doubt 
when ordinary, distantly-removed third-parties hear of an accusation without further information. 
This society resembles pre-1980’s, Freudian-infused Western culture, but is more extreme. The 
epistemic injustice is acute because additional evidence that could address the error possibilities is 
often lacking. Frequently there is no independent corroboration, such as witnesses, for rape. 
 
Lack of hearer error is a novel feature. In theorised varieties of testimonial injustice, the hearer doubts 
the assertion because of a mistake on their part. The doubt is caused by the hearer failing to recognise 
the speaker’s competence or holding unreasonably high standards for acceptance. On this new variety, 
testimonial injustice results in the hearer doubting the speaker, but the hearer is not committing an 
 
36  See Susan Saladoff’s 2011 documentary Hot Coffee. 
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error. They respond properly to epistemic reality. The injustice stems from the way society sculpts 
that epistemic reality.37  
 
Lewis (1996)’s rule of attention holds that attending to an error possibility, however fleetingly and 
randomly, suffices to undermine knowledge. He argues that denying this leaves the allure of skeptical 
arguments unexplained (1996: 561). The skeptic raises error possibilities, such as the brain-in-a-vat 
possibility, against mundane knowledge claims. If those error possibilities remain irrelevant despite 
attending to them, Lewis argues, we should not be swayed at all by skeptical arguments. But, Lewis 
claims, we are. My response is two-fold. Firstly, even if mere fleeting attention to farfetched error 
possibilities cannot undermine knowledge, stable attentional dispositions, such as widespread frequent 
mentioning, can make an error possibility seem, or even become, relevant. Sustained or socially-
distributed attentional patterns and habits are epistemically potent, but Lewis overestimates the 
epistemic power of single attentional instances.38 Secondly, thinking of error possibilities in the ‘ah-
ha’ inducing puzzle-solving mode described above can illusively make error possibilities appear 
relevant. Philosophical skeptical arguments arouse this mode. These features help explain the allure 
of skeptical arguments. 
 
 
9. Conflating ‘P’ and ‘She is Telling the Truth about P’   
The relevant alternatives framework suggests another source of undue doubt and concomitant 
epistemic injustice. A person articulates ‘I was raped’. Hearers should treat ‘I was raped’ as the central 
claim, and consider error possibilities relevant to that claim. Normally assertions that p eliminate most 
or all relevant nearby not-p possibilities. The only remaining uneliminated error possibilities include 
things like ‘she is lying about p’ or ‘she is mistaken about p’. Such error possibilities are ordinarily 
relatively remote. For most purposes and most assertions, such possibilities can be disregarded. 
Consequently assertions are typically believed without the speaker’s needing to present evidence 
addressing the possibility they are lying or mistaken. 
 
As described in section three, this is because assertions are normally sensitive to p. Typically the 
speaker, S, would not have asserted p unless p, so assertions eliminate nearby error possibilities. In the 
remaining error possibilities, S asserts p despite not p; for most kinds of assertion these are relatively 
remote alternatives.39 
 
Rape accusations are often treated differently. Error possibilities in which the speaker is lying or 
mistaken are treated as nearby and preponderant. Even for low standards, such as casual reporting, 
these possibilities are treated as relevant. Speakers hedge with reportative expressions like ‘she says 
she was raped’ and ‘the alleged rape’. One explanation is that when hearing a rape accusation, hearers 
unwittingly treat ‘she is telling the truth about p’, rather than p, as the central claim. Error possibilities 
that should seem distant—ones in which she is lying or mistaken—now seem relevant. This is because 
 
37  Ichikawa (2020) describes a kind of testimonial injustice where the evaluator does not underestimate the accuser’s 
competence, instead they perpetrate epistemic injustice by creating and sustaining high epistemic standards. These high 
standards mean it is true when S says ‘we don’t know what happened’. 
38  Gardiner (2022) investigates the epistemic potency of attention. 
39  For some assertions, error possibilities in which the speaker is lying or mistaken are nearby. This includes assertions 
where the topic is commonly lied about, for example. Gardiner (ms) argues that even if most guilty accused people tell 
the truth and so confess to the rape, most denials are nonetheless lies. To the extent this seems counterintuitive, it 
exemplifies the base rate fallacy.  
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they are relevant to the mistakenly substituted claim. I propose this is a common error when assessing 
rape accusations. This conflation helps explain hearers’ disproportionate tendency to consider error 
possibilities in which the accuser is lying or mistaken.  
 
An analogy might help illustrate. Suppose Larry tells you ‘Carrie’s car is green’. Under most normal 
circumstances, you would readily believe the claim. There is nothing suspicious about it. Suppose 
instead Larry tells you ‘I’m telling the truth, Carrie’s car is green’. In many normal contexts, the second 
assertion raises error possibilities to salience. We begin to wonder whether Larry is lying and question 
his motivations. If we need to know the colour, we might seek independent verification.  
 
This effect can arise when Larry’s assertion is constant, and we change only the proposition assessed. 
Larry asserts ‘Carrie’s car is green’. Compare two epistemic tasks. In the first, we must determine 
Carrie’s car colour. In the second, we must determine whether Larry is telling the truth about Carrie’s 
car colour. In many normal contexts the mere fact of Larry’s assertion is almost conclusive evidence, 
absent defeaters, for the first task. But, by contrast, it is weak evidence for resolving the second; we 
must seek further evidence, such as whether his demeanour seems trustworthy and whether he has 
incentives to lie. The second task typically makes salient many possibilities—Larry is deceiving, 
mistaken, misremembers, or has outdated information—that we can ignore for the first task.  
   
The epistemic difference between the two inquiries is relatively conspicuous in the car example. I 
suggest a similar but unnoticed mechanism induces doubt about rape accusations. The hearer should 
be—and they believe they are—assessing whether p. But they unwittingly substitute ‘she’s telling the 
truth that p’ instead. For the latter claim, the accuser’s honesty, incentives to lie, and potential for false 
belief are acutely relevant. The mere fact the accuser asserted an accusation is weak evidence. Hearer’s 
instead assess, for example, her demeanour or incentives to lie. 
 
This substitution is pernicious in part because eliminating relevant alternatives to ‘I am telling the truth 
that p’ is considerably harder, especially where p is a claim, like ‘I was raped’, where there is frequently 
no corroborative evidence. Hearers might not recognise this conflation in part because it is ubiquitous. 
It constitutes testimonial injustice because the speaker is unfairly held to a more demanding epistemic 
standard. To be believed, the evidence must address error possibilities that should be treated as 
remote. 
  
If the claims ‘p’ and ‘I’m telling the truth that p’ yield different fields of relevant alternatives, then 
accusers themselves can unwittingly cause the field of relevant alternatives to change. They assert the 
latter claim in place of the former, without appreciating that this substitution renders additional error 
possibilities relevant. Asserting ‘I am not lying; p’—such as ‘I am not lying; he raped me’—intuitively 
puts speakers on the backfoot. It seems suspiciously defensive. I suggest the difference is even more 
unfavourable for the speaker: The second assertion introduces the new field of relevant alternatives, 
including especially those in which she is lying. Leveraging this effect, defence lawyers and other 
doubt-mongers bait the accuser into asserting claims like ‘I am not lying’, to make those error 









I have drawn on the relevant alternatives framework to illuminate the doubt endemic to third-party 
uptake of rape accusations. Hearers can overestimate the ordinariness of error possibilities when 
hearing rape accusations and employ unduly distant disregardability thresholds for believing 
accusations in mundane contexts, including by illicitly invoking demanding legal standards in everyday 
conversations and overestimating the costs of false belief. I articulated kinds of mistake highlighted 
by the relevant alternatives framework, such as being too impressed by uneliminated error possibilities 
and mistakenly substituting ‘she is telling the truth about p’ for ‘p’ when assessing accusations. 
 
One theme throughout is that doubt can be a conservative force. It allows people to retain the status 
quo—in minds and society—despite compelling evidence. People’s disproportionate concern about 
the mistake of believing despite inconclusive evidence crowds out concerns about the converse error: 
inappropriate doubt despite excellent evidence. The relevant alternatives framework helps diagnose 
and treat these errors. It emphasises that almost no evidence is conclusive and helps vindicate ignoring 
doubt mongers.  
 
I end by articulating some reservations about Veronica Ivy’s (Rachel McKinnon, 2013) relevant 
alternatives account. As sketched in section three, on this view an error possibility is remote to the 
extent it is ‘destabilising’, meaning its uptake would trigger a significant restructuring of our 
background beliefs. She proposes (McKinnon, 2013: 537), 
 
Non-Destabilising Alternatives Theory (NDAT): An agent may ignore an alternate possibility iff 
the supposition of the alternative possibility would or ought to trigger a rational re-examination 
and restructuring of a significant class of background beliefs. 
  
As Ivy explains, the relevant class is ‘background beliefs about the way the world works’, including 
the social world and one’s own belief-forming abilities. This helps explain why a person can know 
their car is parked outside, despite the uneliminated error possibility that it was recently stolen, and 
that the observed animal is a zebra, despite the ‘cleverly disguised mule’ possibility. Such error 
possibilities, if supposed true, would destabilise beliefs about the social world and about belief-forming 
capacities. Thus, on Ivy’s view, one can disregard these error possibilities and thereby typically know 
the car is in the driveway and the animal is a zebra.  
 
Ivy’s view has merit when our belief-forming practices are good; those beliefs should not be 
destabilised. But what about when belief-forming practices are pathological? What if believers have 
doubts where they should have conviction, and conviction where they should doubt? What if they 
disregard error possibilities—such as the police officer’s lying to protect his colleague—because such 
possibilities would destabilise their belief in the integrity of police officers? Ivy’s view endorses the 
status quo. It allows individuals to retain belief despite uneliminated error possibilities, if those 
possibilities would destabilise their background beliefs about how the world works.  
 
Reflecting on rape accusations highlights that some background beliefs should be destabilised. Some 
people are too confident—and wrong—about how the social world works and about their own and 
other people’s belief-forming practices. They believe that, for example, acquaintance rape is rare, nice 
guys don’t commit rape, victims are almost never friendly to their assailant afterwards, and victims 
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almost always realise that rape occurred. These background beliefs, which perpetuate undue doubt 
about rape accusations, are false.41 
 
This essay focused on misguided and iniquitous doubt. But reflecting on undue confidence in rape 
myths reveals, contrariwise, the value of doubt. Ivy’s view legitimises retaining existent beliefs in the 
face of radical skeptical error possibilities. But her view also aids the more pernicious everyday doubt-
monger, who leverages false background convictions to seed everyday skepticism about rape 
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